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Theory predicts that unit taxes increase the quality consumed in a market since unit taxes reduce the 
relative price of high quality goods. Ad valorem taxes, on the other hand, have no effect on relative 
prices and should not affect product quality. The hypothesis is tested empirically in the US wine 
market. I find that the market share of high quality wine is significantly increased by unit taxes and that 
there is no significant effect of ad valorem taxes, in accordance with the hypothesis and previous 
empirical studies.  
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Taxation gives rise to shifting behavior on many margins. Barzel (1976) put forth the 
idea of quality shifting from taxation. His hypothesis is that unit based taxes, like 
excise taxes, would increase the quality of goods consumed in a market. One 
argument for this is that unit based taxes reduce the relative price of high quality, 
inducing a substitution effect towards high quality. Unit based taxes only apply to one 
dimension of the good, the quantity, while it leaves the quality untaxed. Ad valorem, 
or value based, taxes apply both to the quantity and quality of the good and leave 
relative prices unchanged. Thus, ad valorem taxes should have no effect on the quality 
in a market.  
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The unit tax causes an additional source of deadweight loss due to induced quality 
shifting. In the standard case the deadweight loss is in terms of the quantity of 
products not consumed and produced. If the tax system induces quality shifting, there 
is another margin that must be included when computing the deadweight loss, i.e., to 
what extent people change the quality of goods consumed. Given that the hypothesis 
is true, there are people buying a higher quality of the good than they would have in 
the absence of the tax. Hence they consume goods that are too good, money they 
would rather spend differently had there not been a tax. Also, production is shifted in 
relative favor of higher quality goods, and the social resources are used less 
efficiently. Furthermore, quality shifting in response to unit taxation has consequences 
for tax revenues. Increasing the unit tax will not only make some people not buy the 
item, it will also shift the demand in favor of higher quality goods. These concerns 
may be important when formulating tax policies. 
 
The idea of quality shifting extends well beyond the effect of unit taxes. Any good 
that is available in different qualities and where the price involves a per unit 
component would be affected. The per unit component could involve monetary costs, 
like title and registration fees for automobiles,
2 or time costs, like shopping around at 
different stores to find the best deal. Another related area is trade where shipping costs 
and tariffs constitute fixed costs similar to unit taxes. The hypothesis has implications 
for a wide range of activities, and the welfare consequences are potentially large. 
 
The validity of Barzel’s hypothesis is an empirical question. In this paper I test the 
hypothesis with data from the wine market, which expands the existing literature to a 
                                                 
2 The effects of taxes on demand of automobiles are studied in Fershtman, Gandal, and Markovich 
(1999).  3
new market. I find evidence consistent with quality shifting from low to high quality 
consumption due to unit taxes while ad valorem taxes seem to have no such effect.  
 
Previous tests of Barzel’s hypothesis have focused on the cigarette market. The first 
papers tested the effect of taxes on cigarette prizes. Barzel (1976) and Johnson (1978) 
found support for the hypothesis, while Sumner and Ward (1981) rejected it. A 
different test of the hypothesis is explored in Sobel and Garrett (1997). They test how 
the market share of premium cigarettes is affected by unit and ad valorem taxes. They 
find that unit taxes significantly increase the premium market share, while ad valorem 
taxes have no significant effect. They conclude that their results support Barzel’s 
hypothesis. Recent evidence from the beer market in Rojas and Shi (2010) find 
support for quality shifting based on one change in the federal excise tax and 
differences in transportation costs across brewer and market pairs. Hummels and 
Skiba (2004) use detailed trade data and find support for the quality shifting 
hypothesis based on differences in transportation costs and tariffs. 
 
The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, I outline a simple model for 
analyzing quality shifting through which the empirical estimates can be interpreted. 
The second, and main, contribution is to empirically test for quality shifting using data 
from the wine market, data that have not been explored before. The test uses the 
market share and the results are similar to what is found in the cigarette market.  
 
The literature on how taxes affect the quality of goods consumed is small. This might 
be somewhat surprising since public policy has the potential of affecting quality in 
many areas. One study is Goolsbee (2003). He examines how depreciation allowances  4
to firms affect investment in equipment. Another related area is international trade 
where quotas and tariffs may shift the quality of traded goods.
3 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next sections outline the model and the 
method, which is followed by a section describing the data. Then the section with the 




The two main predictions in Barzel (1976) are that unit based taxes will induce 
shifting towards higher quality of a product, and that ad valorem taxes have no effect 
on the product quality.  
 
One motivation for how unit taxes increase average market quality is based on relative 
prices. Suppose there are two quality categories of a product, high and low with 
respective prices PH and PL, PH > PL. Introducing a unit tax of t reduces the relative 
price of high quality since (PH + t)/(PL + t) < PH / PL. The reduction in the relative 
price of high quality from the unit tax induces a substitution effect toward the high 
quality category. Introducing an ad valorem tax does not affect the relative prices, and 
should have no effect on the product quality.  
 
As pointed out in Sobel and Garrett (1997), a test consistent with the hypothesis can 
be conducted by examining how the market share of the high quality good varies with 
unit and ad valorem taxes. To formalize this argument consider the following model
4. 
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Where s is the proportional sales tax rate and i=H, L and ji. The i represents the 
quality level of the good, which is either high or low. The first argument of g
i(.) 
determines how demand responds to price of that good, and the second argument 
determines how the own price relative to the price of the other quality affects demand.  
 
The first derivatives of g are assumed to be continuous and non-positive for both the 
first and second arguments. Partial derivatives will be denoted by subscripts, so 
i g10 
and 
i g20. The model will exhibit quality shifting if relative prices affect demand, 
that is, if 
i g2<0.  
 
The market share of the quality levels can be constructed using the demand model (1). 
Let MSH denote the market share of the high quality good in terms of physical 
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From the expression of the market share we see that MSH/s=0, so the sales tax has 
no effect on the market share. The second prediction is that higher unit taxes will 
increase the high quality market share, that is, MSH/t>0. For this to be true we need 




Qt ε ε  .
5 In words, the requirement on the model is that the demand of low quality 
goods is more elastic to the unit tax than the high quality demand.  
 
Testing quality shifting using market share data rests on two assumptions. First, the 
function h(.) needs to be the same for both the high and low quality markets. Second, 
an assumption regarding the ordering of demand elasticities is needed to get a positive 
relationship between the market share and the unit tax. The market share test is 
essentially a test of the ordering of the elasticities. 
 
The model outline here is very simple but captures Barzel’s main prediction. The 
model essentially states some conditions under which the prediction will hold. It is of 
course possible to write down more complex models under which the prediction is 
ambiguous, such as Rojas and Shi (2010). At the end of the day, however, it is an 
empirical question to determine if there is quality shifting due to unit costs in real 
markets, which is the main focus of this paper. 
 
3. Empirical Method 
 
As a test of quality shifting, I apply the empirical strategy based on the market share 
similar to Sobel and Garrett (1997). I use a pooled linear regression model where the 
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market share of high quality wine is regressed on unit and sales taxes, state and time 
fixed effects, and additional controls. The additional controls are combinations of 
personal income, unemployment, and population growth. Barzel's hypothesis would 
predict that the coefficient on unit taxes is positive and significant, and that the 
coefficient on sales tax is insignificant.  
 
The empirical model for examining the market share is 
 
%High Qualityst =  + *Unit taxst + *Sales taxst + *Xst +µs+πt+ st   (3) 
 
where %High Qualityst is the market share of high quality table wine in state s and 
year t, Unit taxit is the cents per gallon unit tax on wine with less than 14% alcohol 
content in state s and year t, and Xst is a set of control variables for state s and year t. 
State fixed effects are represented by µs and time fixed effects by πt.  
 
From Barzel’s hypothesis, the coefficient on unit tax  is expected to be positive and 
significant and the coefficient on sales tax  is expected to be insignificant. The 
regression is estimated using ordinary least squares and robust standard errors are 
computed. The identifying assumption is that the tax rate variation is exogenous 
conditional on the control variables. It is reasonable to assume, I believe, that tax rate 
changes are enacted independent of individual demand changes with respect to the 
quality of the good demanded. Since state fixed effects are included it is allowed that 
both the level of taxes and the high quality share vary systematically across states, 
since the parameters of interest are identified from variations around the state specific 
means. The interpretation that tax changes cause changes in the fraction of high 






The available data are on the quantity of domestic and imported table wine consumed 
per year and state in the United States.
7,8  The quantity data is used to construct 
market shares and conduct a test of quality shifting based on the market share of high 
quality wine.  
 
There are two groups of US states with regard to wine sales. 32 states and the District 
of Columbia are License States, which impose wine excise taxes at the state level and 
the distribution and sales of wine is decentralized. The remaining 18 states are Control 
States where the sales of wine is directed by the government and distributed through a 
centralized network. They use a combination of mark-ups and taxes in their pricing 
and it is hard to disentangle what really is a tax. Both the market structure and the data 
are problematic for the Control States. Therefore the License States are used in the 
study, which leaves 33 jurisdictions per product and year. Unit taxes range from 10 to 
246 cents per gallon of wine, and the average is 71 cents per gallon. The states with 
the highest taxes are Florida and New Mexico. The lowest taxes are found in 
Louisiana and New York. There are two sources of variation in the taxes, states that 
change the tax and inflation. There are on average 3 states per year that change their 
unit tax on wine. The tax rates are transformed into real terms using the CPI.  
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The wine data are, as mentioned, divided into the two categories domestic and 
imported. Imported wine is classified as the high quality category and domestic wine 
is the low quality category. The top 5 brands in the respective category are presented 
in Table 1 along with their market shares and average prices. The top domestic wines 
are primarily sold in boxes, big bottles, and jugs. These wines are the budget 
alternatives on the market. The top imported brands are all sold primarily in 75 cl 
bottles and have a significantly higher price. Price is a good indicator of quality since 
consumers would not pay more for a product if it did not deliver a higher value.
9 Price 
per quantity then provides a measure of a good’s perceived quality. The most popular 
imported wines have an average price of 140% above the domestic wines. The 
categories are not perfect since there are a number of more expensive domestic wines. 
However, the consumed quantity of domestic wine is dominated by the low quality 
brands. Furthermore, among the top imported wines there are no brands selling in big 
boxes or jugs as the top domestic brands. Another argument for the quality 
classification is the Alchian-Allen theorem.
10 It states that given constant 
transportation costs, relative prices will be tilted to favor imports of higher quality 
goods.  
 
The classification of imported wine as high quality does not mean that every bottle of 
imported wine is preferred over any bottle of domestic wine by most people.  It does 
not mean that pair wise comparisons of imported wine versus domestic wine given a 
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the wine is Italian). Third, such ratings only cover a subset of the market. It would be hard to control 
for substitution into and out of unrated wines. Fourth, the available data does not allow for such a 
study. 
10 See Borderching and Silberberg (1978).  10
certain price even in most cases come out in favor of the imported wine.  The 
distinction does not imply that professional wine tasters would give imported wine a 
higher grade.  The crucial distinction is that consumers pay more for the average 
bottle of imported wine.  By paying more for imported wine they reveal that they 
value imported wine higher than domestic wine, on average.  The higher price paid 
for imported wine characterizes its higher quality.  It does not matter if the higher 
price can be explained by custom duties, transportation costs, or higher production 
costs.  Consumers have still revealed that they value the imported wines more by 
paying a premium for them.  
 
As seen in the table the domestic wine market is much more concentrated to a few 
brands. As a further comparison the top 25 domestic brands have a market share of 
about 75% while the top 25 imported brands have a market share of 50%.  
 
Table 1. Top Wine Brands in 2000. 
Domestic         Imported      










Winetaps 20166  12.3% $1.60
Concha Y 
Toro 1972 5.0%  $4.35
Carlo Rossi  10500  6.4% $2.00 Riunite  1802 4.6%  $4.45
Almaden 9380  5.7% $2.20 Lindemans  1750 4.4%  $8.20
Livingston 
Cellars 9150  5.6% $2.50
Rosemount 
Estate 1335 3.4%  $9.90
Sutter Home  7200  4.4% $4.70 Casarsa  1210 3.1%  $4.55
Top 5 average      $2.60 Top 5 avg.      $6.29
Share of total     34.3%       20.4%   
Note: Volumes are measured in thousands of 9-liter cases. Market share refers to the share of 
respective category. The top 5 average price is unweigthed. Source: Impact Databank and Adams Wine 
Handbook. 
 
The data are used to construct one dependent variable, the market share of high 
quality wine, as imported wine’s share of the total market. The two main controls in 
the regressions are unit taxes for table wine and general sales taxes for the different 
states and years. Additional control variables considered are personal income,  11
unemployment, and population growth. All monetary variables are deflated using the 
CPI.  The data span 6 years, 1995 through 2000, which adds up to 198 observations. 
The quality measures and dependent variables are assumed to exhibit no more than 
classical measurement errors. Table 2 presents a summary of the data. 
 
Table 2. Data summary statistics. 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
          
Market share of high quality Wine, %  198 16.9 6.1 5.0  33.2 
Unit tax, cents per gallon  198 70.9 49.9 10.6  246.0 
Sales tax rate  198 4.7 1.7 0  7 
Personal income, $  198 26735 4314 19831  40046 
Unemployment, %  198 4.6 1.3 2.3  8.9 
Price, low quality  198 3.44 0.38 2.38  4.35 





This section presents the empirical analysis of the market share of high quality wine. 
The results from the regressions are presented in Table 3. The estimates in the table 
are consistent with Barzel's hypothesis. In all specifications there is a positive and 
significant effect of unit taxes and the effect of sales tax rate is never significantly 
different from zero. 
  12
Table 3. Dependent variable: Market Share of High Quality Wine. 
 1  2 3 4 5 
Unit tax  0.0198  0.0187 0.0188 0.0188 0.0168 
  (.0075)  (.0072)  (.00728) (.00702) (.00665) 
Sales tax rate  0.320  0.420 0.411 0.312 0.294 
  (.564)  (.49)  (.495) (.482) (.496) 
Income   0.00019 0.000527 0.000214 0.000199 
    (.000097)  (.00047) (.000098) (.000098) 
Income squared      -4.95E-09    
     (7E-09)     
Unemployment       0.1396 0.1225 
       (.105)  (.111) 
log Population          -7.94 
         (2.52) 
State Fixed Effects  yes  yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects  yes  yes yes yes yes 
Observations 198  198 198 198 198 
Note: In brackets are robust (Huber/White/sandwich) standard errors. 
 
The first specification only includes the unit and sales tax rates, in addition to the state 
and year fixed effects. The state fixed effects mean that the only variation used to 
identify the estimates is within states across time. The positive estimate on unit tax is 
hence due to the market share for high quality wine being higher during years when 
the unit tax is higher than usual. The year fixed effects account for any aggregate 
effects on the market share of high quality wine. The point estimate on the unit tax is 
positive and strongly significant, consistent with the quality shifting hypothesis. The 
estimate on the sales tax rate is positive but insignificant, which is also in line with the 
hypothesis. 
 
Although state and year effects capture many potential confounding factors there may 
be some time varying factors that drive the market share for high quality wine. One 
such candidate is income, which is included in the second specification. The point 
estimate is positive, so higher income is associated with a higher share of high quality 
wine. The estimates on the unit and sales tax rates remain very similar to the previous 
specification. The third specification allows for non-linear effects of income by  13
including the square of income. The point estimate is negative but insignificant, and 
the term is not included in the remaining models. Another moment of the income 
distribution is captured by the unemployment rate, which is included in specification 
4. The point estimate is positive but insignificant. In the last specification of Table 3 
the log of the state population is included. As state fixed effects are included, the 
estimate on the log population is identified from population growth. The negative 
point estimate, which is significant, tells us that the market share for high quality wine 
decreases when population in the state increases. In all these specifications the point 
estimate on the unit tax remains positive and strongly significant, while the estimate 
on the sales tax rate is always insignificant. Both these results are consistent with 
Barzel’s hypothesis of quality shifting. 
 
The effect of unit taxes on the product quality is 1.35 percentage points evaluated at 
the average, that is, the product quality in the wine market is 1.35 percentage points 
higher solely due to the unit taxes. The average effect of unit taxes is smaller 
compared to Sobel and Garrett’s (1997) study of the cigarette market. One 
explanation for this may be that taxes relative to the product price are smaller in the 
wine market. 
 
The results in Table 3 provide support of Barzel’s hypothesis and they are consistent 
with the previous study in the cigarette market in Sobel and Garrett (1997). The 
evidence from the wine market also line up with Rojas and Shi (2010) study of the 
beer market.  
 
5.1 Alternative Stories: Interaction results  
  14
It may be argued that the wine market is segmented into a high quality and low 
quality part. The responses found could then be interpreted as the low quality segment 
being more sensitive to price. When taxes increase it pinches the low segment more 
and they shift out of the market. If this is true we would expect low quality consumers 
with higher income to be less responsive to the tax. This could be tested by interacting 
unit tax with income and including it in the regressions. 
 
Another concern may be that agents don’t purchase the wine in the state they live, but 
rather cross the state line. Agents in high tax states would be more prone to do so. To 
test for this I use two different interactions. They are unit tax interacted with 
population density or state size. The argument for the tax-population density variable 
is that small states tend to have larger population density and that it is easier to cross 
the state border in a small state. For the tax-state size interaction the argument is that 
large states have longer borders, which makes it easier to cross them.  
 
None of the interaction terms come up significant in the regressions. The point 
estimate of the tax-income interaction even has the unexpected sign. It seems like the 
data do not support any of these alternative stories. 
 
It may be argued that the wine market is special. One argument would be that there is 
a fraction of the market that is ultra premium where prices are not set in a competitive 
way. However, the quantity of wine in this category is negligible compared to total 
wine consumption. The situation is not unlike other markets like, for example, 
clothing and automobiles where exclusive designer fashion or extreme performance 
cars demand a hefty price premium. That there is a very high quality niche in a market  15




In this paper I have empirically tested Barzel’s hypothesis, which asserts that unit 
taxes shift consumption to higher quality and that ad valorem taxes have no effect on 
the quality consumed. I find that unit taxes significantly increase the market share of 
high quality goods and that ad valorem taxes have no effect on the market share. The 
results are consistent with the hypothesis. 
 
The results indicate that the quantitative significance of quality shifting is limited in 
the US wine market. The influence of unit taxes on the quality consumed and 
produced does not seem to produce large distortions of the quality composition in the 
wine market. This implies that the welfare loss from unit taxation, as compared to ad 
valorem taxation, may be relatively limited. This could be due to particulars in the 
wine market, for example that taxes constitute a smaller share of the total price in the 
wine market compared to the cigarette market.  
 
Nevertheless, it is important to learn that quality shifting may be present also when 
excise taxes are not a major part of the products cost for the consumer as it provides 
evidence that the effect is present across markets. Quality shifting could of course be 
quantitatively important if the taxes are a major of the total price of wine, as is the 
case in several Scandinavian countries. It would hence be very interesting to see 
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Appendix 1. Conditions for dMSH/dt>0 
 
This section derives the condition to get dMS/dt>0. Recall that the market share of 
high quality consumption is 
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since the demand elasticity with respect to the unit tax is  
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